Only 9% of Ukrainian refugees in the Nordic countries want to return to Ukraine as soon as the war is over, a new report from NIBR shows. What matters most for whether they want to go home is their trust in the Ukrainian authorities – not where in Ukraine they come from or how hard their home town has been hit.
What does the new research say about returning to Ukraine?
The research foundation NIBR at OsloMet, commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has examined what it would take for Ukrainian refugees to return home. The report Why return to Ukraine? (NIBR Report 2025:4) is based on a survey of 3,379 displaced Ukrainians in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, carried out in the autumn of 2024 and the winter of 2025, along with interviews with both refugees and Ukrainian authorities.
The figures offer little hope to the Ukrainian authorities who dream of a large-scale homecoming:
- 9% say they will go back as soon as the war is over.
- 14% will return in the longer term.
- Almost half are not planning to go home any time soon, and around 40% do not envisage returning to Ukraine at all.
An important point is that most people only want to go home to their own home town. A full 82% say they would rather stay in their host country than start life over in a different Ukrainian city – for example if their home town is occupied or destroyed.
Trust in the authorities matters most
When the researchers ran a regression analysis of the answers, one factor stood out as clearly the strongest: the respondents' trust in the Ukrainian authorities. Without such trust, the likelihood of wanting to return is very low.
More surprising is what the researchers did not find. Where in Ukraine people come from – whether their home area is under Russian control, or how hard it has been hit by the war – has no significant bearing on whether they want to go home. Those who come from areas that were occupied but have since been liberated by Ukrainian forces are nonetheless slightly more motivated to return.
Half (51%) are afraid of negative attitudes from those who stayed in Ukraine after the 2022 invasion. Men are also far less inclined than women to want to return – something the researchers interpret as fear of stigma or of mobilisation to the front.
The children are the main reason to stay
For families with children, the decision is first and foremost about the children. 86% cite an uncertain and unstable future for their children as decisive for the choice, and 58% are worried about how difficult it will be to put their children back into Ukrainian school after several years away.
Parents living in Norway with children under the age of 18 are less likely to want to go home. Several of the refugees interviewed for the NIBR study describe taking their children back as "tearing up the roots all over again". We take a closer look at this in the article on Ukrainian children between Norwegian and Ukrainian school.
At the same time, family ties pull in both directions: having a spouse or children still in Ukraine increases the motivation to return.
Why is it a problem that the "wrong" people go home?
Behind Ukrainian return policy lies a deep demographic crisis. The population fell from around 52 million in the early 1990s to just over 43 million before the full-scale invasion in 2022. The Ministry of National Unity works with an estimate of around 32 million for 2024.
The paradox is that those who actually go home now are mainly elderly people and people with health problems – not those of working age who could strengthen the workforce Ukraine sorely needs. People of working age more often stay abroad.
To deal with this, in December 2024 Ukraine set up a dedicated Ministry of National Unity, led by Oleksii Chernyshov. The ministry is meant both to build national identity and to facilitate voluntary return. Work is also under way on a change in the law that would allow dual citizenship – something previously banned in Ukraine.
What do the findings mean for Ukrainians in Norway?
As of 1 May 2026, 86,184 Ukrainians had collective protection in Norway, according to UDI. The scheme has been extended "one last time" until March 2027, and those who have held a permit the longest may have it extended for a fourth and fifth year. At the same time, the rules are being tightened: from 5 May 2026, Ukrainian men aged 18 to 60 will no longer automatically receive collective protection, but must apply for individual protection. Read more about the new rules for Ukrainian men in Norway.
Both the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) believe the conditions for a safe and dignified return are not yet in place, and that return must be voluntary and informed. The research points out that the Norwegian authorities send "mixed signals": at the national level it is stressed that the stay is temporary, while municipalities and employers welcome the labour. That uncertainty shapes everyday life for many. We have taken a closer look at how Ukrainians move from temporary protection to work, and at the path towards permanent residence for Ukrainians in Norway.
The conclusion of the research is sober: a just peace will only partly draw the refugees home. Trust, safety and a future for the children must be in place first.
Source: Holm-Hansen, J., Deineko, O., Myhre, M. H. & Aasland, A. (2025): Why return to Ukraine? An analysis of Ukraine's evolving return policies and the motivations of refugees to return. NIBR Report 2025:4, produced by OsloMet for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Figures and interview quotes are taken from the report. Updated figures on protection in Norway: UDI and regjeringen.no (2026).
